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John J. Costonis "
The foreign relations provisions of the Rome Treaty, the charter
of the European Economic Community (EEC),' have occasioned
enthusiastic comment throughout the first decade of the Community's
existence.' They appear on their face to endow the EEC with powers
over external relations that significantly outpace those of other international organizations. 3 Under these provisions the EEC may enter
into tariff,4 commercial,' and association " accords with outside states
and international organizations, and establish other "needful" ties with
the latter groupings.7 In addition, the foreign relations provisions
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I There are three European Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the
European Economic Community (EEC). Respectively, they were established under
the ECSC Treaty, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; the Euratom Treaty, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958; and the EEC Treaty, March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958. Throughout this review,
references to the "Community" and to the "Rome Treaty" or "Treaty" should be
understood to designate the EEC and the EEC Treaty. All quotations from the EEC
Treaty are from the unofficial translation provided by the Publishing Services of the
European Communities.
2 Representative appraisals include, e.g., Dupuy, Du Charactere Unitaire de la
Communaut Acononique Europienne Dans Ses Relations Exterieures, 1963 ANN.
FRAN. DR. INTL. 779; Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for the
Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEX L. REv. 891 (1965) ; G. GIARDINA, COMMUNrrA
EuaoPE E STATI TEazi (1964) ; Megret, Le Pouvoir de la Cominunauti l*conoinique

Europiene des Accords Internationaux, 1964 R.M.C. 529; Pescatore, Les relations
ext&ieures des CommunauMs Europiennes, 103 REc. DES COURS 134 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Pescatore] ; P. RAux, LES RELATIONS EXTkRIEURS DE LA COMMUNAUTt

(1966).
a For a careful comparison of the treaty-making powers of the EEC with those of
other international organizations, see Pescatore 53-67. For a treatment of the treatymaking powers of international organizations generally, see, e.g., Dupuy, Le Droit
des Relations entre Les Organizations,100 Rlc. DES Cotms 461 (1960) ; Parry, TreatyMaking Power of the United Nations, 26 B.Y.I.L. 108 (1949) ; J. SCHNEIDER, TREATYMAKING POWER OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1959) ; H. SOCINI, GLI AccoRni
INTERNAZIONALI DELLE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERGOVERNATIVE (1963).
4 EEC Treaty art. 111.
t EEC Treaty art. 113.
6 EEC Treaty art. 238.
7 EEC Treaty art. 229-31. See also, id. art. 230, 231.
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charge the Community with administering a common external tariff
for third-state imports into the six member states,' with developing a
common commercial policy governing patterns of trade between the Six
and the outside world,' and with coordinating the positions of the
member states in other international economic organizations in which
they participate.'"
Notably, these provisions seem to assign to the Community organs
a role of partnership with, if not dominance over, the member states in
discharging these responsibilities. Particularly striking in this respect
are the procedural rules established by article 228 for the exercise of
the Community's treaty-making powers." The charters of the few
other international organizations that possess a foreign relations
competence generally assign only the negotiating function to the intergovernmental organ and require the approval of the national parliaments
of member states as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
negotiated accord.' 2 In contrast, article 228 confers overwhelming
responsibility for conducting the EEC treaty-making function upon the
Community organs, leaving the member states with a seemingly
marginal role in this area. Naming the EEC Commission-the organ
charged with furthering the "general interest" of the Community' 3 as the negotiator of Community accords, article 228 also provides that
these accords directly bind the member states upon conclusion by the
EEC Council. In addition, the article requires the Council to consult
8EEC

Treaty art 18-29.

9 EEC Treaty art. 111-16.
10 EEC Treaty art. 116.

"EEC Treaty art 228 provides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between
the Community and one or more States or an international organization, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
conferred upon the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by the Council after the Assembly has been consulted in the cases provided for by this Treaty.
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may, as a preliminary,
obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to the compatability of the contemplated agreements with the provisions of this Treaty. An agreement which
is the subject of a negative opinion of the Court of Justice may only enter
into force under the conditions laid down, according to the case concerned, in
Article 236.
2. Agreements concluded under the conditions laid down above shall be binding
on the institutions of the Community and on the Member States.
12 See, e.g., EFTA Treaty art. 41-2, which provides:
The Council may negotiate an agreement between the Member States and
any other State, union of States or international organization, creating an
association embodying such reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions
and special procedures as may be necessary or appropriate. Sich an agreenent shall be submitted to the Member States for acceptance and shall enter
into force provided that it is accepted by all the Member States. Instruments
of acceptance shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall
notify all other Member States.
(Emphasis added). See generally, authorities cited in note 3 supra.
13 EEC Treaty art. 157-2.

1316

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Voi.116

with the European Parliament prior to concluding association accords
and empowers the Community Court to pass on the compatibility of
a proposed accord with the Rome Treaty. Article 228, in conjunction
with articles 236 and 238, restricts the participation of the member
states as such in the Community treaty-making process to requesting a
Community Court ruling on the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with
a proposed accord and to amending that Treaty to cure any incompatibility declared to exist by the Court.
Writing some three years after the formation of the EEC, Professor Pescatore, presently a member of the Community Court, appraised the Community's treaty-making provisions as a "veritable
transfer of powers to the Community in the domain of external relations." 14 In the same study he concluded that "in the sphere prescribed
by the Treaty, it is the Community which from now on will act in the
place and service of the States, and it is the [Community] which will
bind the States by its undertakings." "5 In the absence of substantial
Community practice under the relevant Treaty provisions, Professor
Pescatore's projections were largely based upon an analysis of the
bare texts of the Rome Treaty and the underlying political and
economic objectives of that document.
The months and years following Professor Pescatore's appraisal
have provided a rich vein of material for students of the Community's
foreign relations powers. Invoking article 238, the Community concluded association agreements with Greece, Turkey, a group of eighteen
African states (most of which were former French and Belgian
colonies) and Nigeria.' 6 Utilizing its powers under article 111 to
negotiate tariff accords with third states and groups of states, the
Community participated in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of tariff
bargaining in the GATT, and concluded bilateral tariff accords with
Israel and IranY In addition, it has completed negotiations with
Lebanon on a commercial accord under article 113 entailing an exchange of tariff concessions and the provision of technical assistance by
14 Pescatore 134.

15 Id.

16 The Community has contracted the following association accords under article
238: Accord Creating an Association Between the EEC and Greece, [1963] E.E.C.J.O.
294 [hereinafter cited as the Greek accord] ; Accord Creating an Association Between
the EEC and Turkey, [1964] E.E.C.J.O. 3687 [hereinafter cited as the Turkish accord];
Convention of Association Between the EEC and the African and Malagasy States
Associated with this Community, [1964] E.E.C.J.O. 1431 [hereinafter cited as the
Yaounde accord]; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the EEC and

the Republic of Nigeria, 1966 INT'L LEG. MAT. 828-58 (unratified) [hereinafter cited
as the Nigerian accord].
17Tariff accords that have been concluded at the time of writing (February, 1968)
include the Commercial Accord between the EEC and the State of Israel, [1964]
E.E.C.J.O. 1518; Commercial Accord between the EEC and the Imperial Government
of Iran, [1963] E.E.C.J.O. 2555; the "Dillon Round" agreement entered into by the

EEC with the partners of the Six in GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
July 16, 1962, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2889, T.I.A.S. No. 5253; and the "Kennedy Round"
agreement entered into on the same basis, see Le Monde, 1 Jul. 1967, at 17.
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the Six to bolster the Lebanese economic development program.' 8 In
its first decade, the Community has also established numerous ties with
international organizations 9 and has taken important steps in the
design and implementation of a common commercial policy linking
the Six with the outside world in economic matters.20

Though unavailable to Pescatore as a source for his appraisal of
the EEC's foreign relations powers, the Community practice described
above provided a basis upon which subsequent commentators could
re-evaluate his earlier conclusions. Later writers too, however, have
largely restricted themselves to the bare text of the Treaty and to
general principles and, not surprisingly, have arrived at even more
enthusiastic conclusions.
By ignoring Community practice as a clue to the scope of the
Community's foreign relations powers, the commentators have left many
serious questions unresolved. One notable deficiency in the literature
is the absence of any systematic consideration of the extent to which
the Treaty texts have in fact been interpreted to facilitate the "transfer
of powers to the Community in the domain of external relations" projected by Pescatore. Is the Community master, servant or equal
partner of the member states in the conduct of EEC foreign relations?
Again, the articles themselves abound with fundamental gaps and
ambiguities. Only Community practice can serve to complete the
faltering or purposefully vague work of the Treaty's framers. It is
that practice, for example, which will establish the content of the EEC's
''common commercial policy" and the permissible scope of a Community
"association accord," as those terms are used in articles 111 and 238
respectively.
Failure to examine the administrative machinery that has been
devised for managing Community foreign relations has left obscure
the relative contributions of the Community organs, the member governments, and national and Community-level private groups. To what
extent, for example, is the EEC Commission subject to pressures from
these sources when it negotiates tariff and commercial accords of broad
economic import? Furthermore, the formalistic inquiries of the commentators have not illuminated the emerging contours of the economic
and political objectives which guide the exercise of the Community's
foreign relations powers. What policies influence the Community's
18The EEC has successfully completed negotiations on an accord with Lebanon.
See the Accord on Commercial Exchanges and Technical Cooperation Between the
EEC and the Member States, on one side, and the Lebanon Republic, on the other,
1965 INT'L LEG. MAT. 728-32.
19 The Community has not published a schedule of its agreements with international organizations. It is known, however, that it has entered into agreements with
the International Labor Organization, see [1959] E.E.C.J.O. 521, and with UNESCO,
see 8 GmT. REP. 305 (1965). A summary of the Community's relations with international organizations during 1967 may be found at 10 GEx. REP. 378-81, 401-04 (1967).
20 See Everling, Legal Problenm of the Common Commercial Policy in the Europeal Economic Community, 4 Com. MAR. L. REv. 141 (1966).
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relations with the United States, the "Outer Seven," the Communist
bloc countries and the developing nations of Latin America, Africa and
Asia? To what extent do those policies reflect Community autonomy
in the exercise of its foreign relations powers?
In The European Common Market and the World,2 Professor
Werner Feld has taken a giant step past existing appraisals of the
Community's foreign relations powers by rooting his study firmly in
the soil of a decade of Community foreign relations practice. The
holder of degrees in law as well as in political science, Feld does not
minimize the significance of Treaty texts and other formal commitments of the member states as determinants of the scope of the Community's foreign relations powers. On the contrary, the introduction
and first chapter of the study contain a comprehensive analysis of the
guidelines found in the Treaty and in general international law for the
exercise of these powers. But Feld also recognizes that the evolution
of independent Community control over its external relations threatens
entrenched governmental and private interests at the member state
level. Sensitive to the impact of these institutional stresses upon the
manner in which the formal texts have been interpreted, Feld probes
many of the issues that have been largely ignored by previous commentators. His use of interviews, questionnaires and other empirical
techniques further sharpens his exploration of these issues. Thanks to
Feld's balanced perspective and disciplined investigative methods, the
reader comes away from The EuropeanCommon Market and the World
with a sounder grasp of the gap between textual promise and actual
performance, the manner in which ambiguities in the Treaty text have
been resolved by hard practical decisions, and the intricate administrative system that has been devised for the conduct of Community
foreign relations. The reader is also instructed in the policies pursued
by the Community in its dealings with the outside world.
The format of the study reflects Feld's twin objectives: portraying the operation of the Community system in the elaboration of foreign
relations policies, and setting forth the content of these policies with
regard to different areas of the world. The book has two parts, the
first pursuing the former objective, the second the latter. As noted
above, the legal basis for Community involvement in external relations
activity is recorded in the introduction and first chapter. The next
three chapters deal in turn with the relative roles and contributions of
the Community organs, the six national administrations, and the
private, national, and Community-level elites in the formulation of
Community policy. In Part II, Feld treats successively the Community's relations with European non-member states, non-European
industrialized free-world states, developing countries, and Communist
states. He concludes the study by speculating about the likely shape
21
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of future Community foreign relations policies, particularly as they
relate to the United States, and about the probable role of the Community organs in their formulation and execution.
Professor Feld's treatment of the economic and political dimensions
of his subject is skillful and persuasive. To this reader, however,
Feld's most valuable contribution is his systematic, empirical appraisal
of the respective roles of the Community organs and the member states
in the formulation and execution of Community foreign relations
policies. Summarizing his findings, Feld concludes:
As far as the making of external Community policy is
concerned, the member governments generally appear to
have been the masters controlling this process and to have
used the EEC and the external policy instrumentalities it
offers for their own purposes. On the other hand, the EEC,
acting as a unit through the Commission, so far has had only
limited success in directing how national economic policies are
to serve the Community interest. With the exception of matters affecting the [common external tariff] or [common
agricultural policy] levies, the member governments have
largely chosen when to use EEC or national policies for the
pursuit of their foreign economic policy objectives. They have
determined the form and substance of the EEC policies. They
have closely controlled and supervised the activities of the
Commission when negotiating with third countries, permitting
the Commission only a minimum of discretion. And they
have controlled to a large extent the execution of policies,
although the Commission, as guardian of the Community
interest, could admonish or even complain to the Community
Court in case of Treaty violation. In fact, however, the Commission has been primarily the servant of the member governments, collecting statistics, compiling information, coming
forth with ideas and suggestions, and elaborating recommendations for the reconciliation of the divergent interests of
the member states, but really not having more than an oblique
influence on the final deliberations and judgments of the
member governments. Other Community organs, such as
, which also have been assigned roles
the Parliament . .
have been even less
in the external policy making process,
22
Commission
the
influential than
These conclusions will touch off spirited debate among EEC
scholars. They clash with the seeming import of the treaty provisions
which, like article 228, accord the Community organs a dominant role
22 W. FELD, TE EUROPEAN COMMON MA.KET AND THE WORLD

162-63 (1967).
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in the formulation and pursuit of EEC external policy. They challenge
the consensus among Community students regarding the purportedly
innovative nature of the EEC's powers in the international organizations field. And they do not seem to square with the Community's
record of accomplishment over the last decade as measured by the number and significance of its international agreements and its initial steps
in constructing a common commercial policy.
But this writer is convinced of the essential soundness of Feld's
position. The member states have in fact been successful in systematically paring down the foreign relations prerogatives seemingly granted
the Community under the Rome Treaty. This generalization applies
with dramatic force to the stunted evolution of the Community's treatymaking power, a subject of special interest to the writer.3 As we have
seen, article 228 allocates responsibility for the conduct of the Community treaty-making process among the Council, Commission, European Parliament and Community Court, and virtually excludes the
member states as such from a significant role in this process. But how
has article 228 been applied over the last decade? Though designated
as the Community organ that "negotiates" EEC accords, the Commission has been little more than the Council's agent or plenipotentiary
in treaty negotiations 4 The Parliament's influence has virtually been
eliminated by the Council's insistence that the former body be con25
And
sulted after rather than before signature of Community accords.
the Court has yet to pronounce on the compatibility of a Community
8
accord with the Rome Treaty, although seven 2 of the Community's
27
directly confronted the Community with this difficult
nine accords
issue.
The obvious beneficiary of the reduced influence of these Community bodies is the Council and, through it, the member states themselves. Let it not be thought, however, that the shift of control to the
Council has been fortuitous. On the contrary, the members of the
Council-themselves under instruction from their home governmentshave engineered the shift through two basic techniques. First, they
have narrowly interpreted key provisions of the Rome Treaty to enlarge
the residual treaty-making powers of the member states at the expense
of the delegated powers of the Community. In doing so, of course,
they have displaced the Community Court as the arbiter of the scope
of the EEC's treaty-making power, a circumstance that goes far toward
Com23 See Costonis, The Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic
munity: The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 Com. MAR. L. Rzv. - (March, 1968).
24W. FELD, supra note 19, at 163.
25
See, e.g., Report, Eur. Parl. Doc. No. 61, 18 Sept. 1961; Report, Eur. Parl.
Doc. No. 94, 25 Nov. 1963.
26 The accords in question are the Greek, Turkish, Yaounde and Nigerian association accords, the Dillon and Kennedy Round tariff accords and the Lebanon commercial accord.
'27See notes 16-19 supra.

1968]

BOOK REVIEW

explaining why the Court's jurisdiction under article 228 has not been
exercised since the Community's inception. The technique of narrowly
construing the delegated treaty powers also legitimates direct memberstate intervention in the "Community" treaty-making process. The
states have been quick to grasp the opportunity. Their representatives
have participated as "national observers" in most of the Community
negotiating sessions. Furthermore, their executives and national
parliaments have signed and ratified each Community accord adjudged
by the Council to exceed the Community's competence.
In addition to construing the Rome Treaty narrowly, the Council
has carefully constructed the administrative machinery for the conduct
of Community treaty-making activity to guarantee a dominant role to
the member states. Professor Feld provides an excellent description
of this machinery in chapters 2 and 4 of his book. One might wish,
however, that he had given greater emphasis to the intimate relationship between the Treaty's construction and the choice of administrative
mechanisms. Only by making the threshold determination that a given
matter touches upon a residual competence of the member states can
the Council legitimate direct member-state intervention in the Community foreign relations process.
Is the existing trend irreversible? Feld thinks not. The development of a single internal market within the Community, he speculates,
may generate pressures on the member states to relax their grip on
the formulation and execution of concomitant external relations activities. Evidence of this possibility may be found in the agricultural field:
as the Community accedes to greater control over internal Community
agricultural policies, the member states have tended to concede it a
greater role in shaping external policies in this area. Feld also conjectures that the member states may agree to coordinate their over-all
foreign relations policies outside the framework of the Treaty and the
Community. While this step may eliminate conflicts among the member states, however, he properly questions whether it will lead to a
strengthened role for the Community.
Two other factors not explicitly treated by Feld may also portend
foreign relations role for the Community during the next
increased
an
decade. One is the growth of a habit of cooperation among the Six
resulting from their efforts to coordinate national viewpoints within a
Community framework each time a Community accord or external
relations policy is debated in the Council. It cannot be doubted, of
course, that considerably more than this habit and the machinery devised
to implement it is necessary to effectuate a meaningful transfer of
foreign relations powers to the Community. At the same time, however, the Community's existence is now a political fact which none
of the member governments can easily disregard. To do so might
antagonize the other members or, worse still, dissipate the greater
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political leverage vis-A-vis third states that may accrue to a member
country through coordinated six-nation action.
An even more important factor has been highlighted by Walter
Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission, in his farewell
address to the European Parliament:
Europe feels deeply that her form of life today is profoundly inadequate. She continues to suffer gravely from the
gap between the vocation powerfully rooted in sentiment that
Europe has qualities that call her to assume a fundamental
responsibility in world politics and the inability to regroup
her resources and organize them to be able to fulfill this
vocation. This is the true reason for the European malaise
of which so much has been said."8
From hardened Gaullists to committed Eurocrats, the undesirability
if not danger of the Six remaining fragmented in a world of superpowers is uniformly recognized. Whether the issues concern measures
of defense to deal with a feared United States economic imperium and
technical superiority, or the adoption of bargaining positions on tariff,
monetary or development aid questions before international organizations, the leverage of the Six is immeasurably increased if they proceed
on the basis of a truly common policy. The rub, of course, is that in
pursuing policies orchestrated and directed at the Community level,
the member nations surrender pro tanto their control over the conduct
of their own external relations. Although the advantages of common
action have been widely extolled in the first decade of the Community's
existence, they have not proven sufficiently attractive to counter the
regressive forces that have stifled the evolution of the Community's
treaty-making powers. But they could easily prove overpowering
should the next decade see a substantial increase in the pressures on
the Six generated by international economic competition and a decrease
in the hold that nationalism-whether strident or covert-exerts over
the behavior of the member states within the Community.
This review commenced with a summary of a number of central
issues that students of the Community's foreign relations powers have
tended to overlook. It would be too much, of course, to expect that a
single volume could remedy omissions of such long standing. In
The European Common Market and the World, Professor Feld has
nevertheless taken remarkable strides toward illuminating much that
was previously obscure. More important, perhaps, his volume constitutes a model of disciplined inquiry and thoughtful analysis that
places all students of Community affairs in his debt.
2

Speech of Professor Walter Hallstein to the European Parliament, 21 June i967.

